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The Internal Challenge to Malaysia 
GORDON P. MEANS 
Gustavus Adolphus College 
ABSTRACT - This paper presents an account of the activities of the major oppos1t1on parties in 
Malaysia. Because Indonesia has tried to utilize some opposition parties to bring about the down-
fall of the present government of Malaysia, special attention has been given to the impact of 
Indonesia on the Malaysian political scene. 
Indonesia's announced policy of "crushing" the newly 
formed Federation of Malaysia has threatened to plunge 
Southeast Asia into turmoil and internecine war. The 
reasons for Indonesia's campaign against Malaysia have 
been examined at some length elsewhere. 1 What has re-
ceived slight attention heretofore has been the impact of 
the dispute upon the internal political situation in Ma-
laysia. 
A brief sketch of the political scene in Malaysia must 
precede an account of how Indonesia has tried to ma-
nipulate Malaysian politics in its attempt to strangle the 
new federation in its infancy. 
The Federation of Malaysia was formed on Septem-
ber 16, 1963 by the union of Malaya, Singapore, Sara-
wak, and North Borneo (Sabah). Malaya is the largest 
and most important of these states, and its political and 
economic stability is essential for the success of the new 
federation. Since 1955, the ruling party in Malaya has 
been the Alliance, a coalition of three communal parties 
representing the major ethnic communities of Malaya. 
The United Malays National Organization (UMNO) 
represents the Malays, the Malayan Chinese Association 
(MCA) the Chinese, and the Malayan Indian Con-
gress (MIC) the Indians. While these three parties 
have retained their separate identity and communal 
structure, their leaders operating within the Alliance co-
alition negotiate compromises that balance the compet-
ing demands of Malaya's multi-racial population . As a 
consequence the Alliance Government has taken moder-
ate positions on both communal and economic issues to 
obtain wide popular support from all elements of the 
population. 
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The Alliance policies that have been evolving since 
1955 have tended to be along the following lines: First, 
extreme communalism in politics has been avoided, but 
the Government has recognized a special responsibility 
for improving the economic position of the Malays be-
cause of their poverty in comparison with the other com-
munities. Besides extensive rural development programs, 
"special rights" are available to the Malays in the form 
of reserved lands, and special Malay quotas are estab-
lished for employment in the public services, scholar-
ships, and certain business licenses. 
Second, while recognizing the importance of the Chi-
nese, Indian, and European cultural traditions in Ma-
laya, the Government has been placing increased em-
phasis upon Malay culture and language that are ex-
pected, not to replace the other cultural traditions, but 
to provide a common bond to unite the nation. 
Third, the Government has stimulated substantial eco-
nomic growth by encouraging private capital investment, 
both domestic and foreign. 
Fourth, the Government is openly anti-Communist, 
having survived a Communist guerrilla insurrection of 
about 12 years. Although it permits limited trade with 
Communist China, it is fearful that Communist China 
will utilize the overseas Chinese to promote revolution 
or to extend its dominion. 
By its monopoly of the moderate center of the political 
stage, the Alliance Government has forced the opposi-
tion parties to recruit support among those elements of 
the population that reject moderation and are willing in-
stead to divide the country against itself or to look 
abroad for support. The main pockets of political oppo-
sition have congregated at both extremes of the commu-
nal axis of conflict. Chinese chauvinists attack the Gov-
ernment for being too "pro-Malay" and for policies 
designed to encourage the Malayan Chinese to forget 
their political and historical ties with China. The Gov-
ernment's education, immigration, and foreign policies 
have been subjected to a continuing barrage of criticism 
from an embittered minority of these Chinese chauvin-
ists, some of whom believe that their political salvation 
and the future of "Chinese culture" depend upon the ex-
pansion of Communist Chinese influence over Southeast 
Asia. 
At the other end of the communal spectrum are the 
militant Malay nationalists who claim that "Malaya be-
longs to the Malays" and that all other communities are 
"alien." They contend that the non-Malays, regardless 
of their loyalties or length of domicile, should not be 
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given citizenship or allowed to share equally in the eco-
nomic wealth of the country. These Malay communal 
chauvinists want the Government to pursue more mili-
tant "pro-Malay" policies and to give no concessions to 
the political and economic demands of the non-Malay 
communities. Because the Malays constitute slightly less 
than a majority of the population of Malaya, the radical 
Malay nationalists have hoped to redraw the political 
map in Southeast Asia to tip the political balance in 
their favor and, thus to nullify the present power of the 
Chinese and Indians. For years these militantly racialist 
Malays have been toying with the idea of Melayu Raya 
-loosely translated as "Greater Malaysia" but taken to 
mean the formation of a Southeast Asian empire em-
bracing all peoples of Malay ethnic stock. The same ob-
jective has been promoted by Indonesian nationalists, 
but they prefer to call it Indonesia Raya. Presumably, 
this empire would incorporate all of Islamic Southeast 
Asia, including Indonesia, Malaya, the Borneo states, 
the southern part of Thailand, and the southern part of 
the Philippine Islands. 
Although poles apart, Malay communal chauvinists 
and Chinese communal chauvinists have shared some 
common objectives that include the defeat or overthrow 
of the present Malaysian Government and the disruption 
of the Federation of Malaysia; the discrediting of the 
parliamentary process that promotes moderation and 
compromise; and the encouraging of anti-westernism 
tinged with racial overtones. Although holding incom-
patible views, communalist leaders have cooperated in 
their joint attacks upon the Government. The Marxian 
model of politics as "class warfare" has proven to be a 
convenient meeting ground for communal chauvinists 
among the opposition parties, since it facilitates coopera-
ation among communal extremists by temporarily shift-
ing the axis of political conflict from communalism to 
economic grievances. Thus, Malayan politics demon-
strates that Marxism can be utilized as a temporary tac-
tical expedient to promote communal objectives, just as 
nationalism has at times been utilized to promote Com-
munism. 
The political complex of Malayan politics may be il-
lustrated by Figure I that diagrams the relative position 
of the Alliance Government and the opposition parties 
along the communal and economic axes of political con-
flict. 2 
An important factor in the creation of the Federation 
of Malaysia was that such a wider union would retain 
approximately the same communal and political balance 
as that of Malaya. This was possible because Singapore's 
large Chinese majorities could be offset by large majori-
ties of Malays and native peoples in the Borneo states of 
Sabah and Sarawak. 
The negotiations to create the Malaysian Federation 
were exceedingly complicated, since the new union had 
to take into account the different cultural ethnic eco-
nomic, and political interests of each of [he four' units 
2 The economic axes on the diagram are not at right angles 
to the communal axis because of the greater poverty among the 
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joining the federation. Since these negotiations were con-
ducted by those who controlled political power in each 
of these states, the final Malaysia Agreement reflects the 
points of view of the majority party or the majority co-
alition in each constituent state. Even though the major 
opposition parties were consulted during the negotia-
tions, the opposition parties have generally opposed Ma-
laysia as finally constituted because their views were not 
given higher priority, and because the majority parties 
strengthened their political position by the new union. 
Although the new federation was negotiated with the 
view to creating a minimum political disturbance in each 
of the constituent states, it has had the effect of exacer-
bating communalism among the opposition parties be-
cause it weakened their power and presented a direct 
challenge to the hopes of some opposition leaders for 
fundamental realignments in Southeast Asia. 
Table I. Communal Distribution in Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, 
Sabah and Malaysia 
Malaysiansa Chinese Indians Others 
Malaya . . ....... 49.8% 37.1% II.I% 2.0% 
Singapore .... . ... 13.6% 75.1% 8.6% 2.7% 
Sarawak . . . . . . . . . . 68.1% 30.7% 0.3% 0.8% 
Sabah . . . . . . . . . . . . 68.2% 23.1% 0.7% 8.0% 
Federation of 
Malaysia total . . . .. 46.5% 42.0% 9.3% 2.2% 
"The category "Malaysians" includes Malays and indigenous 
tribal peoples, on the assumption that their politiool and com · 
munal interests are very similar. However, there are important 
differences which undermine this assumption when certain politi-
cal issues are at stake. 
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A review of some of the activities of the more impor-
tant opposition parties will illustrate some of the com-
munal tensions that have surfaced since the formation of 
Malaysia. 
The Pao-Malayan Islamic Party l PMIP) is the strong-
est and most effective spokesman for Malay communal-
ism. Its leader, Dr. Burhanuddin, was included in the 
Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee that drew 
up the first proposals for Malaysia. After five months of 
silence, the PMIP finally announced its opposition to the 
formation of Malaysia because Indonesia and the Philip-
pines were not included. In criticizing government policy, 
the PMIP tried to impress upon the Malays that the new 
union would place them in a minority and not "safe-
guard their interests." The Malay communalist position 
of the PMIP was strengthened in late 1962 when the 
Alliance Government removed its Minister for Agricul-
ture and Cooperatives, Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, because 
he persistently administered his department with such a 
"pro-Malay" bias that the communal compromises of 
the Alliance were being imperiled. Abdul Aziz later tried 
to found a new party based on his personal following 
among the Malay peasantry, but ultimately his National 
Convention Party became little more than an ancillary 
to the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party in espousing Malay 
communalism and the ideas of Melayu Raya. 
Another opposition party in Malaya is the Socialist 
Front. It is a coalition of two separate parties of which 
the largest is the Labour Party of Malaya, which is pri-
marily Chinese-led and has close ties with some of the 
larger unions in the country. In 1957 it joined forces 
with a radical left-wing Malay party called Party Ra'ayat. 
The latter was led by Ahmad Boestamam who had led 
a revolutionary Malay youth organization that was 
banned in 194 7 by the British. He is widely known for 
his Indonesian sympathies and for his militant approach 
to politics. In order to hold the Socialist Front together, 
communal issues were ignored or glossed over. Economic 
grievances and anti-western anti-imperialism were 
stressed instead. The two parties agreed to oppose Ma-
laysia "because of the way it was implemented," thus 
avoiding the problem of offering specific alternatives. 
Even so, the Socialist Front has suffered from grave in-
ternal stresses, particularly since the non-Malay political 
following of the Labour Party has been so much larger 
than Party Ra'ayat's Malay support. 
The extreme chauvinist and Communist-inspired Chi-
nese are scattered and are not too effective in Malaya. 
However, in Singapore they are concentrated in two op-
position parties - the Barisan Sosialis and the United 
People's Party. Since 1961 these two parties have been 
engaged in an extended campaign to block or break up 
Malaysia, and to defeat or overthrow the relatively non-
communal Peoples Action Party, which has retained 
power in Singapore since 1959 despite its near defeat in 
1961 when the PAP split and its legislative majorities 
were reduced to the minimum. Shortly after the forma-
tion of Malaysia, elections were held in Singapore and 
the Peoples Action Party was returned to power, polling 
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47 per cent, whlle the remainder of the vote was split 
among pro- and anti-Malaysia opposition parties (see 
Table 2). 
Table 2. Party Distribution in Singapore Legislative Assembly 
Before and After September 1963 Elections 
Before 
Peoples Action Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
Barisan Sosialis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
United People's Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
Singapore Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 





In Malaya the Government also decided to renew its 
mandate, confident that it would secure popular support 
despite the severity of Indonesia's attacks against Malay-
sia. The election held in April 1964 resulted in increased 
majorities for the Alliance.4 By adding the seats from 
Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah to the Malaysian Parlia-
ment, the Alliance held 125 seats out of a total of 159, 
while only 14 seats were held by opposition parties that 
were definitely "anti-Malaysia." 
Table 3. Parliamentary and State Elections in Malaya, 
1959 and 1964 
1959 1964 
Parli ament Sta te Parl!ament 
Alliance ... . .... . . .. . ' . . 74 207 89 
Pan-Malayan Tslamic Party . 13 42 9 
Party Negara .... .. . . . . . . I 4 
Socialist Front . . . . . . . . . . 8 16 2 
Peoples Progressive Party. 4 8 2 
Malayan Party . . . . . . . . . . I 
United Democratic Party . . 
Peoples Action Party .. ... 







The election results throughout Malaysia made the 
more extremist opposition politicians more desperate 
than ever; the results provided ample evidence that the 
governments in these states had gained general popular 
support for the Malaysian Federation and had been able 
to capitalize on a growing sense of Malaysian national-
ism that was being generated in large measure by the 
severity of Indonesia's military and economic offensive 
against Malaysia. 
The anti-Malaysia opposition began to take desperate 
action even before Malaysia was formed. In February 
1963 the Governments of Malaya and Singapore, and 
the British authorities, which were then still in control 
of internal security in Singapore, obtained evidence that 
Communist extremists in Singapore would try to join 
forces with Indonesia to make havoc, to attempt the over-
throw of the Singapore Government, and to block the 
formation of Malaysia. The Government used its emer-
gency powers to arrest 107 pro-Communist and pro-
fndonesian politicians in Singapore, including some 
'The party distribution in Parliament including all the states 
of Malaysia was as follows : Alliance, 125; Peoples Action Party, 
13; Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, 9; Barisan Sosialis, 3; Peoples 
Progressive Party , 2; Socialist Front, 2; Sarawak United Peoples 
Party, 3; Independent. I. 
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prominent figures in the Barisan Sosialis Party, as well 
as the Chairman of Party Rakyat Singapore. Shortly 
thereafter, Ahmad Boestamam, the leader of Malaya's 
Party Ra'ayat was also arrested for planning subversive 
activities with Indonesian cooperation. In prison, Boesta-
mam made the following statement that was later re-
leased by the Government: "I am prepared to cooperate 
with the Communists to achieve my long-term plan to 
unite Indonesia, the Philippines, the Borneo territories, 
South Thailand, Malaya and Singapore into a greater 
Malaysia state. . . . In other words, I shall use the 
Communists, but I shall not be indebted to them." It is 
hardly necessary to add that the Communists and the 
extreme Chinese chauvinists have been following the 
same tactic, but with a different end in mind. 
Capitalizing on the disillusionment and frustrations of 
pro-Indonesian opposition leaders, Indonesia began di-
rect involvement in Malayan politics on an increasing 
scale after 1963. During the 1964 Malayan election cam-
paign Indonesia gave secret financial assistance to the 
Pan-Malayan Islamic Party and Party Ra'ayat amounting 
to about M$250,000. After the overwhelming Alliance 
victory, Indonesian secret agents began to press for the 
formation of a "Malayan Government in Exile" to be 
formed by as many opposition leaders as could be per-
suaded to leave the country. Such a move was to be co-
ordinated with internal disorders and, hopefully, the for-
mation of anti-government guerrilla forces in Malaya 
aided by Indonesian arms and "volunteers." The pattern 
was to be somewhat similar to the one that had been fol-
lowed during the Indonesian-inspired Brunei revolution 
of January 1962, which, although it failed, resulted in 
the formation of an exile "Government of Kalimantan 
Utara" in Jakarta and claimed authority over the Borneo 
states. 
The planned disorders were touched off in Singapore 
in July 1964 with the apparent cooperation of Com-
munist-leaning Chinese extremists and militant pro-Indo-
nesian Malays. Both elements hoped to capitalize on the 
chaos that was expected to follow. In a Machiavellian 
maneuver, racial rioting was triggered in Singapore when 
a small bomb was tossed into a Muslim procession cele-
brating the Prophet Mohammed's birthday. About a doz-
en persons were killed and about 400 were wounded in 
the ensuing racial clashes between Malays and Chinese. 
Singapore was placed under strict curfew for several 
weeks while government-sponsored "goodwill commit-
tees" tried to reduce communal tensions. 
Shortly after the Singapore rioting, in August and Sep-
tember, Indonesian guerrillas were landed by boat and 
air-dropped into southern Malaya. Indonesian agents 
also succeeded in persuading pro-Indonesian opposition 
leaders to prepare to form a "Malayan Government in 
Exile" in order to lend credence to Indonesia's conten-
tion that Malaysia was a "neo-colonialist plot" imposed 
upon the people against their will. However, before these 
Malay opposition leaders could leave the country, the 
police intercepted a large number of their secret com-
munications to and from Indonesian agents. In late Jan-
144 
uary 1965, the top leaders of Malay communal extrem-
ism were arrested. The list included Dr. Burhanuddin, 
President of the PMIP; Dato Raja Abu Hanifah, Vice-
Chairman of the PMIP; Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, President 
of the National Convention Party; Ishak bin Haji Mo-
hamed, former Chairman of the Socialist Front; and V. 
David, former Socialist Front Member of Parliament. 
Ahmad Boestamam, President of Party Ra'ayat, had been 
imprisoned earlier. 
The evidence against these individuals was published 
in a parliamentary white paper, which, if accurate, clearly 
demonstrated that the radical Malay opposition parties 
had been engaged in a series of acts that were nothing 
short of treason. Despite the evidence, no political parties 
were declared illegal, and action has been taken only 
against individuals for their activities. 
These events illustrate that the fundamental problems 
of nation-building involve more than the creation of 
stable majorities at the polls. Extremist minorities, ever 
ready to resort to violence, pose a serious threat in any 
society, but this is especially true in the emerging states 
of Asia and Africa. Under these circumstances, democ-
racy and constitutional order are subject to serious threats 
from at least two quarters: First, from opposition parties 
willing to use a political crisis and foreign support in the 
pursuit of political power heretofore denied at the polls; 
and, second, from a government that could become so 
preoccupied with meeting a crisis that it might decide 
democracy and constitutional processes are luxuries 
which cannot be tolerated during such a national emer-
gency. Even in an established and stable country the dis-
tinction between a "loyal opposition" and a "disloyal op-
position" is difficult to make with precision. In a coun-
try only just beginning the process of nation-building, 
such a distinction is even more uncertain and, in any 
case, too subtle to be appreciated by most of the popula-
tion who have yet to think in terms of loyalty to the 
nation-state "Malaysia." 
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